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In 1973, Shyamala Rajender, a postdoctoral fellow at the 
University of Minnesota, filed a class action against the state college 
for sexual discrimination.1 Her efforts culminated in a settlement that 
enjoined the University from discriminating against women on the 
basis of sex.2 Three decades later, nine members of Abercrombie & 
Fitch’s salesforce sued the company, alleging employment 
discrimination on the basis of minority status and gender; the parties 
settled for a sum around $40 million.3 And in 2013, a class 
spearheaded by George McReynolds settled with Bank of America 
                                                          
 J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A./B.S./M.S., University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. The 
author would like to thank his friends and family for constantly supporting his 
academic and professional endeavors, as well as his SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW 
Honors Seminar professor, teaching assistants, and peers for their editorial input. 
1 Rajender v. University of Minnesota, 561 F. Supp. 401 (D. Minn. 1983). 
2 Id. 
3  Press Release, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Case: Abercrombie & Fitch 
Employment Discrimination (June 17, 2003), http://www.naacpldf.org/case-
issue/abercrombie-fitch-employment-discrimination. 
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after accusing the financial colossus of denying black employees equal 
pay and promotional opportunities in favor of white peers.4 
Each of the above-noted plaintiffs used the class action 
procedure to leverage their resources against opponents with plentiful 
litigation war chests.5 After all, plaintiffs’ capacity to pool resources—
and prosecute a claim with the prospect of a fee shift under the 
common fund doctrine—acts as one justification for upholding the 
class mechanism’s effect on litigation. Class actions reduce the 
frequency of imbalanced, David-versus-Goliath lawsuits, where an 
individual sues a corporation and risks the litigation divesting her of 
time and money at the hands of a wealthier, immortal opponent.6 
Historically, the United States provided an accommodative 
environment for class filings.7 Yet, since the mid-2000s, the country’s 
jurisprudence warped from this supportive position, and has permitted 
individual arbitration provisions to whittle away at claimants’ access 
to group litigation.8 This gradual erosion of plaintiff classes’ rights 
culminated in the 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision American 
Express Co. v. Italian Color Restaurant; there, a divided Court held 
that a federal statute’s mandate requiring enforcement of arbitration 
                                                          
4 Alanna Petroff, Bank of America Fined $2 Million for Race Discrimination, 
CNN MONEY (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/24/news/companies/bofa-racial-discrimination/. 
5 The McReynolds case, for example, featured over 1,000 plaintiffs in the 
purported class. Karen Weise, Judge Approves Merrill Lynch's $160 Million Racial 
Bias Settlement, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-06/judge-approves-merrill-
lynchs-160-million-racial-bias-settlement. The lawsuit brought by Ms. Rajender 
featured a class of all women at the University of Minnesota system that were 
subject to disparate promotional and hiring practices. Rajender, 563 F. Supp. at 402. 
6 See RICHARD L. MARCUS, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & HOWARD M. ERICHSON, 
COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 7 
(5th ed. 2010). 
7 West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 721 (1820). 
8 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on 
a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse. And here is the 
nutshell version of today's opinion, admirably flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too 
darn bad.”). 
2
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provisions had not been overridden by federal antitrust laws that had 
permitted class proceedings.9 The result functionally foreclosed a 
group of plaintiffs from pursuing valid but financially negligible 
claims on an individual basis. 
Italian Colors and its precursors have been interpreted as curbing 
employees’, shareholders’, and consumers’ abilities to pursue certain 
statutorily granted rights as a group.10 In virtually every case, the 
Supreme Court considered these arbitration provisions’ validity, 
affirmed their enforceability despite their preclusive effects on class 
actions, and left the lower federal courts to administer its holdings in 
other statutory contexts.11 
This Note traces the Seventh Circuit’s application of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on a contract requiring individual arbitration in 
Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp.; the case addresses Epic Systems 
Corporation’s (“Epic”) arbitration clauses in its employment 
agreements—clauses which contractually blunted a plaintiffs’ class 
from aggregating a cause of action under the National Labor Relations 
Act (“NLRA”).12 The Note first overviews the caselaw surrounding 
class actions and arbitration provisions. In Part II, I assess the Lewis 
decision for its impacts on class actions. I conclude that federal 
appellate courts normatively grapple between extending Italian 
Colors’ holding to statutes like the NLRA,13 and protecting plaintiffs’ 
access to a litigation mechanism that can provide them cogent 
redress.14 These difficult choices lead to a veritable tapestry of 
decisions concerning class arbitration that both uphold the practice in 
some cases, and fully prevent it in lieu of individual arbitration in 
others. Finally, this article calls on the Supreme Court to resolve the 
circuit split caused by Lewis by upholding the Seventh Circuit’s 
                                                          
9 Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. at 2306. 
10 Brian Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L.R. 161, 175 (Mar. 
10, 2015), http://www.arizonalawreview.org/pdf/57-1/57arizlrev161.pdf (noting that 
class actions are headed for demise). 
11 Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. at 2312; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
12 Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016). 
13 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244). 
14 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244). 
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decision to abrogate the arbitration provision in the plaintiffs’ contract. 
Such a holding would memorialize the class action’s nadir at the hands 
of the Federal Arbitration Act, and perpetuate a spirit that preserves 
collective actions’ use in asserting statutory rights. 
 
I.  OVERVIEWING CLASS ACTIONS THROUGH THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT AND CASE LAW 
 
A.  The Federal Arbitration Act 
 
The point of greatest contention in class arbitration jurisprudence, 
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), does not directly address class 
actions in its verbiage, largely because such a proceeding did not 
formally exist until the recent adoption of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23.15 Yet, the Supreme Court and its subordinate brethren 
have used the FAA as a justifiable fulcrum for upholding individual 
arbitrations.16 Thus, an overview of the FAA might help some 
conceptualize the issues surrounding class actions and arbitration.  
Congress enacted the FAA in the Roaring Twenties both to 
solidify alternative dispute resolution’s (“ADR”) growing presence 
alongside traditional litigation, and to ward off hostile judges trying to 
keep their dockets from shrinking.17 Courts have honed in on two of 
the statute’s sections—§ 2 and § 4—as a means of scrutinizing class 
arbitrations’ permissiveness in the ADR context.18 Section 2 states that 
contractual provisions between parties that bind those parties to 
arbitration for disputes arising from that contract “shall be valid, 
                                                          
15 See generally 9 U.S.C. (2012) FRCP Rule 23 was merged with Equitable 
Rule 38 in 1938, and underwent a major revision in 1966. See generally Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23. Both actions took place after Congress passed the FAA in 1925. 
16 See Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. at 2312; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351 
(2011). 
17 Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 163 n.6 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. 
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20 n.6 (1985)) (“The House Report accompanying the 
[Federal Arbitration] Act makes clear that its purpose was to place an arbitration 
agreement ‘upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs’ . . . and to 
overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”). 
18 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4 (2012). 
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irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”19 By the same token, 
parties who have not contractually agreed to class arbitration cannot be 
bound to it; one case simplified the idea to a catchy phrase: 
“arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.”20 In turn, § 4 
compels a district court to relegate parties to arbitration when one 
party to the contract tries to litigate an issue covered within the scope 
of that contract’s arbitration clause.21 The Supreme Court interprets 
these sections together to outline where it does and does not possess 
the power to review arbitral decisions. 
 
 B.  Summarizing a History of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
Like most American law, the class action mechanism sailed its 
way into Yankee courts on English winds. Ironically, just as the 
English Court of Chancery witnessed steeply declining filings of 
group actions in London, the Supreme Court of the United States 
upheld their domestic validity in West v. Randall.22 Despite class 
actions’ availability, many lawyers relegated this tool to an unused 
cupboard until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure codified the 
modern class action in Rule 23.23 Since then, lawyers have used the 
class mechanism in a panoply of contexts, from settling aggregate tort 
liability in asbestos24 and Agent Orange cases,25 to compensating 
shareholders in securities suits against corporations,26 to aggregating 
                                                          
19
Id. § 2 (2012). 
20 Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). 
21 9 U.S.C § 4 (A court that is “satisfied that the making of the agreement for 
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue . . . shall make an order 
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.”) 
22 West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 721 (1820). 
23 FED R. CIV. P. 23. 
24 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
25 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145, 148 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
26 Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 800 F3d. 674, 685 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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employee discrimination claims against businesses.27 Class actions’ 
popularity, in tandem with litigation’s soaring use and cost, continued 
to rise with each passing decade.28 In the 1980’s, though, traditional 
litigation found itself competing with a newer, private form of dispute 
resolution. 
Alternative dispute resolution—both through its less formal 
iteration, mediation, and more formalized procedure, arbitration—
began its prominent rise during the Reagan administration.29 Part of 
this growth stemmed from the Supreme Court’s shifting outlook on 
ADR; in that decade, the Court swayed from its once-held belief that 
private dispute resolution did not adjudicate parties’ legal rights, and 
instead called for greater use of arbitration.30 Whether that policy shift 
stemmed from judges realizing that the U.S. court system suffered 
from incurable backlog, or whether the Burger Court sought to 
reaffirm a then-necrotizing right to contract, is less relevant when 
compared to the meteoric rise in ADR’s popularity.31 
Individuals appreciated that ADR offered efficiency and 
economy.32 Litigants did not spend months bogged down in procedural 
minutia, and arbitration served as a temporal foil to the litigiously 
clogged courts, whose rulings on trivial pre-trial motions could fill a 
span of months; in contrast, an entire arbitration could go from 
opening arguments to a final award in a matter of days.33 If parties 
wished, they could contractually curb rules of civil procedure, and 
                                                          
27 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1041 (2016). 
28 Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and 
Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution”, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 872 
(2004). 
29 Id. 
30 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2 (1984). 
31 Stipanowich, supra note 28at 872. 
32 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011) (“In bilateral 
arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in 
order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater 
efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve 
specialized disputes.”). 
33 See id. 
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limit the number of experts each side could call to testify.34 Mediation 
is even less formal; unless stated otherwise in a contract, if the parties 
in mediation do not resolve their disputes, a mediator’s 
recommendation binds neither party.35  
Many bought into this efficacious mantra. From the mid-1990’s to 
the early 2000s, demand for ADR services grew four-fold.36 Like 
sharks drawn to blood, the commercial world soon caught whiff of 
ADR’s benefits, added arbitration provisions into many of their 
contracts with suppliers, and, in time, expanded their use of these 
clauses by incorporating them into employee contracts, product 
packaging, and stock certificates.37 
Many businesses viewed pre-dispute arbitration clauses as a 
golden goose. For them, employees, consumers, and shareholders 
provided financial sustenance; if a businesses’ relationship with one of 
these groups dulled, both sides contractually bound themselves to 
arbitration.38 Naturally, commercial entities thought that such 
                                                          
34 Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 73, 88 (2011). 
35 Some forms of arbitration also do not feature binding decisions, though many 
arbitration clauses in commercial and non-commercial settings do feature finality in 




rWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D658kn0n0b_55 (last visited Dec. 1, 
2016). Mediation infrequently requires the mediator to issue a decision, much less a 
binding one. Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation: What's the Difference?, 
FINDLAW, http://adr.findlaw.com/mediation/mediation-vs-arbitration-vs-litigation-
whats-the-difference.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
36 Stipanowich, supra note 28, at 872. 
37 Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Beware the Fine Print Part 1: 
Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html.  
38 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2306 (2013); 
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2067 (2013); AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336–37 (2011); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 
539 U.S. 444, 449 (2003). 
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agreements called for individual arbitration, meaning that the business 
only had to arbitrate against one employee, consumer, or shareholder 
at a time.39 However, aggrieved plaintiffs sought to bring the benefits 
of suing as a class into arbitration proceedings. They unconventionally 
combined the Rule 23 with the Federal Arbitration Act, and created a 
new type of proceeding: class arbitration, a class action conducted 
within an arbitration proceeding’s confines.40 Suddenly, the golden 
goose looked less like a judicially divined gift and more like a costly 
ugly duckling. 
 
C.  Preconceived Notions: The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on 
Class Arbitration Before Concepcion 
 
After plaintiffs’ lawyers invented the class arbitration, the 
commercial sector quickly litigated against its validity; the first suit to 
make its way up to the Supreme Court was Green Tree Financial 
Corp. v. Bazzle.41 The case featured a class who sued a lender for a 
failure to disclose certain information about its mortgages.42 A state 
trial court both certified a class action and entered an order compelling 
arbitration.43 The justices faced a question of first impression: whether 
an arbitrator could interpret an arbitration clause silent on the matter of 
class arbitration as forbidding the practice, or whether such 
interpretations were relegated to courts.44 
A plurality of justices concluded that this question constituted a 
matter of “procedural arbitrability”—whose resolution rested with an 
arbitrator—as opposed to one of “substantive arbitrability”—whose 
resolution rested with a court.45 Thus, the arbitrator did not encroach 
on the state court’s power when he decided the class arbitration could 
                                                          
39 See generally Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013); Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333; Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
40 Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 444. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 448–49. 
43 Id. at 449. 
44 Id. at 447. 
45 Id. at 452–53. 
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go forward.46 Green Tree, however, dodged the confounding issue of 
whether an arbitration clause’s silence on class proceedings permit the 
such actions, or whether silence forecloses on class arbitrations 
altogether. 
The Court let this question fester for seven years until resolving it 
in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.47 Writing for a 
majority, Justice Alito concluded that the FAA precluded a plaintiff’s 
class from dragooning a defendant into a class arbitration when the 
contract entered into by the parties was silent on the type of arbitral 
proceeding.48 Alito reiterated a prior case’s central theme: arbitration 
“is a matter of consent, not coercion.”49 
The majority’s opinion shifted the Green Tree inquiry in a slight 
but profound way. Whereas Green Tree asked whether the arbitrator 
had erred in holding the parties intended to foreclose the class 
mechanism in arbitration, Stole-Nielsen required arbitrators to inquire 
whether parties had agreed to arbitration. Thus, the Court moved the 
negotiating burden onto plaintiffs, who would now have to bargain for 




                                                          
46 Id. at 455. 
47 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666 (2010). 
48 Id. at 687. 
49 Id. at 681 (quoting Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). 
50 This suggestion expects plaintiffs to, above all, understand that they have the 
class arbitration mechanism even available to them before they sign a contract, a fact 
which very few consumers know about. Moreover, because many of these contracts 
are contracts of adhesion, there is no possibility of negotiating favorable terms by 
individuals. See Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Study 
Finds that Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers (Mar. 10, 2015), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-
arbitration-agreements-limit-relief-for-consumers/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2016). 
9
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D.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
 
One of the two most prominent class arbitration cases, AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion, assessed a direct confrontation between the 
FAA and state law addressing alternative dispute resolution.51 The 
case’s plaintiffs sought to certify a class in a federal district court 
alleging that AT&T had engaged in deceptive advertising for free cell 
phones.52 In response, the communications giant filed a motion to 
compel arbitration.53 Unlike Green Tree or Stolt-Nielsen—which 
featured arbitration clauses silent on the issue of class arbitration—the 
agreement signed by the case’s plaintiff’s featured a pre-dispute clause 
requiring individual arbitration.54 The contract also contained 
claimant-friendly terms.55 
A California district court held that AT&T’s arbitration provision 
violated the state’s unconscionability doctrine as interpreted by its 
Supreme Court in Discover Bank v. Superior Court. Under the 
“Discover Bank rule,” standard-form contracts that allowed a party to 
evade liability from “negative value” claims—claims whose cost to 
litigate individually exceed a claimant’s expected damages awards—
were unconscionable.56 
The Supreme Court reversed in a splintered five-to-four vote.57 
The majority concluded that the FAA’s § 2 preempted Discover Bank, 
and that, because the plaintiffs had not explicitly contracted for class 
arbitration in the proceeding-at-hand, they used state law to 
manufacture a mechanism that differed from the one agreed to by the 
parties.58 Justice Scalia bolstered his majority opinion with two policy 
points: arbitration’s informality, and its lack of appellate review.59 
                                                          
51 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011). 
52 Id. at 336–8. 
53 Id. at 338. 
54 Id. at 333. 
55 Id. at 337. 
56 Id. at 351–2.  
57 Id. at 352. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 349. 
10
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First, he argued that class arbitration would morph ADR into 
procedurally laden proceedings, populated with an endless stream of 
experts and hefty attorneys’ fees.60 Both would hamper arbitration’s 
“lower costs, greater efficiency . . . [and] speed.”61 Second, Scalia 
opined that courts’ allowance of class arbitrations would cause 
businesses to forego arbitration provisions in their contracts 
altogether.62 The apparatus’s increased costs (stemming from 
accommodating a class arbitration) and narrow standards of appellate 
review—which, for example, come about only in cases of fraud or a 
lack of jurisdiction in matters of “substantive arbitrability”—would 
result in “defendants . . . be[ing] pressured into settling questionable 
claims.”63 For these reasons, the majority concluded that the plaintiffs 
had to pursue their claims in individual arbitration.64 
  
E.  American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant 
 
While Concepcion did not address a negative value suit brought 
under a federal statute, the Court considered such an issue in American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.65 The case presented a fairly 
simple question: did the FAA permit “courts . . . to invalidate 
arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not permit class 
arbitration of a federal-law claim”?66 A restauranteur alleged a 
negative value claim against American Express (“AmEx”); despite a 
class waiver and an arbitration clause in his contract, he filed an 
antitrust class action against the credit card colossus.67 
Round one went to AmEx when a federal district court granted the 
company’s motion to compel arbitration,68 but the Second Circuit 
reversed on the ground that individual arbitration’s trial costs for the 
                                                          
60 See id. at 348. 
61 Id. 
62 See id. at 350. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 352. 
65 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).  
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 2306. 
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plaintiffs blocked them from asserting Sherman Act claims 
individually.69 To the appellate court, class arbitration was a logical 
compromise that both preserved AmEx’s desire for private dispute 
resolution and permitted the plaintiff’s to pursue their cause of action 
without it costing them more than each claim was worth.70 Further, 
AmEx’s arbitration provision was less generous when compared to 
Concepcion’s; these unfavorable terms made it easier for the plaintiff 
to assert that the contract he had entered into prevented him from 
litigating an allegedly valid claim against AmEx.71 
The Court analyzed whether the plaintiff’s argument that the 
contract weakened his ability to sue under the Sherman Act overrode 
the FAA’s § 2 mandate to interpret parties’ arbitration agreements by 
their terms.72 The plaintiff raised an exception in the FAA that 
invalidates arbitration clauses when they prevent the “effective 
vindication” of statutory rights; because each class member asserted a 
“negative value” claim, those members could not effectively bring 
their claims without the class action mechanism.73 
Justice Scalia disagreed. Delivering a knockout blow to the 
plaintiffs, the conservative jurist concluded that the Sherman Act does 
                                                          
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 2309. 
71 AmEx’s arbitration terms were far less generous than AT&T’s in 
Concepcion. Compare AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 3367 
(2011) (“In the event the parties proceed to arbitration, the agreement specifies that 
AT&T must pay all costs for non-frivolous claims; that arbitration must take place in 
the county in which the customer is billed; that, for claims of $10,000 or less, the 
customer may choose whether the arbitration proceeds in person, by telephone, or 
based only on submissions; that either party may bring a claim in small claims court 
in lieu of arbitration; and that the arbitrator may award any form of individual relief, 
including injunctions and presumably punitive damages.”) with Brief for Respondent 
at 17, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304, (No. 12-133) 
(Moreover, the plaintiffs in Concepcion . . . would be able to vindicate those claims. 
Under the distinctive pro-consumer features of AT&T Mobility’s arbitration clause, 
‘aggrieved customers who filed claims would be ‘essentially guarantee[d]’ to be 
made whole,’ making the claims at issue ‘most unlikely to go unresolved.’”). 
72 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244); Italian Colors Rest., 
133 S.Ct. at 2309. 
73 Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. at 2309. 
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not “guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of 
every claim,” nor does it have any intent that waives class procedures; 
“the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a 
statutory remedy . . . does not constitute the elimination of the right to 
pursue that remedy.”74 Dissenting, Justice Kagan noted that enforcing 
the individual arbitration provisions would throw up insurmountable 
barriers to litigation, including expert witness costs that would 
outspend expected individual damages awards by double-digit 
multiples.75 She opined that “[n]o rational actor would bring a claim 
worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant incurring costs in 
the hundreds of thousands.”76 Ultimately, the Justices factionalized 
along similar ideologies as they had in Concepcion, with the majority 
holding the FAA does not permit courts to invalidate individual 
arbitration clauses.77  
 
F.  The Circuit Split: D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. and Lewis v. Epic 
Systems Corp. 
 
The same year the Supreme Court announced its decision in 
Italian Colors, the Fifth Circuit decided D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB.78 
In D.R. Horton, a class of superintendents sought to initiate class 
arbitration proceedings alleging that their employer had “misclassified 
them as exempt from statutory overtime protections in violation of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.”79 Horton advised the claimants that they 
signed a “Mutual Arbitration Agreement” that required individual 
arbitration between each claimant and itself.80 In response, the 
claimants filed an NLRA infraction with the National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB” or “Board”).81 A Board administrative judge 
                                                          
74
 Id. 
75 Id. at 2316. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 2309–12. 
78 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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determined that Horton had indeed violated the NLRA by restraining 
the employees from engaging in a collective action guaranteed under § 
7 of the Act.82 Horton appealed to the Fifth Circuit.83 
The appellate court reversed the NLRB’s decision in a two-to-one 
split.84 Writing for the majority, Judge Southwick reminded the Board 
that, while courts ordinarily give the agency’s adjudicatory arm 
judicial deference, such deference would be withheld where the Board 
has interpreted the NLRA to the ignorance of other “Congressional 
objectives.”85 No previous case had held class action waivers in 
arbitration agreements as violative of § 7.86 Judge Southwick 
understood that concerted actions brought by workers against 
employers served as a means of parlaying improved employment 
terms; however, he observed that preservation of the FAA’s modern 
interpretation merited a more compelling interest.87 
The majority opined that class action procedures are not a 
substantive right guaranteed to litigants.88 While the class action may 
help claimants receive some form of remedy through its procedures, 
the mechanism itself does not serve as that remedy.89 The Board 
claimed that the Mutual Arbitration Agreement violated § 7 of the Act, 
and thus triggered the FAA’s savings clause that did not require its 
enforcement.90 Yet, in mirroring the Supreme Court’s rationale in 
Concepcion and arguing that the FAA required the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, the Fifth Circuit majority concluded that the 
savings clause was not triggered.91 In rationalizing this conclusion, 
Judge Southwick reiterated Justice Scalia’s points on class arbitration 
proceedings: they are inefficient, they prevent multilayered review, 
                                                          
82 Id. at 355–56. 
83 Id. at 348. 
84 Id. at 364. 
85 Id. at 356 (quoting Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)). 
86 See generally id. 
87 See id. at 359–60. 
88 Id. at 357. 
89 See id. 
90 Id. at 359. 
91 Id. at 362. 
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and they would serve as a disincentive to businesses for including 
arbitration agreements in their contracts in the first place.92 
Similarly, the majority failed to find a contrary congressional 
command, either express or implied, in the NLRA that showed a 
congressional will to circumvent the FAA and disallow arbitration 
clauses.93 It then concluded that the Board’s ruling was improper, and 
that Horton’s arbitration agreement with its employees must be 
enforced.94  
In dissent, Judge Graves agreed with the Board and that Horton’s 
contract violated the plaintiffs’ abilities to pursue a statutorily-granted 
and substantive right to collective action.95 Further, the jurist argued, 
while the FAA was intended to prevent an ongoing judicial crusade 
against private dispute resolution in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, “[t]o find that an [individual] arbitration agreement must 
yield to the NLRA is to treat it no worse than any other private 
contract that conflicts with Federal labor law.”96 
Graves’s opinion took some time to reverberate across the 
appellate courts, but eventually it struck a chord with Judge Wood 
when the Seventh Circuit considered Lewis.97 There, the plaintiff 
class’s employer, Epic Systems Corp. (“Epic”), emailed its employees 
an arbitration agreement that mandated individual arbitration for 
certain “covered claims,” such wage-and-hour disputes.98 The clause 
further proscribed parties from 
 
[b]ring[ing] a claim on behalf of other individuals, and 
any arbitrator [from]: (i) combin[ing] more than one 
individual's claim or claims into a single case; (ii) 
participat[ing] in or facilitat[ing] notification of others of 
                                                          
92 Id. at 539. 
93 Id. at 360–61.  
94 Id. at 364. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 365 (quoting D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012 WL 36274, at *11 (2012)). 
97 See generally Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016). 
98 Id. at 1151 
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potential claims; or (iii) arbitrat[ing] any form of a class, 
collective or representative proceeding.99 
 
The email stated that if the employees continued to work at Epic, they 
accepted this provision; it also required an acknowledgment from each 
employee at the end of the email.100 The lead plaintiff acknowledged 
these emails.101 However, once a labor dispute developed between him 
and Epic, he sued in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Wisconsin.102 The corporation moved to compel arbitration, 
and Lewis countered, alleging that the arbitration clause violated the 
National Labor Relations Act by “interfer[ing] with employees’ right 
to engage in concerted activities.”103 The district court denied Epic’s 
motion to dismiss, and the business appealed to the Seventh Circuit.104 
The NLRA provides that employees may “engage in concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid 
or protection,” and furthers the protection of this right by rendering 
unenforceable any contracts that renounces employees’ rights 
guaranteed by Act.105 The NLRB has consistently rebuked employers 
from imposing individual agreements that curbed employees’ access to 
concerted actions.106 And while the Act did not explicitly define 
“concerted activities”, both the district court and the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that class actions “fit well within the [term’s] ordinary 
understanding.”107 Epic contended that, because FRCP Rule 23 did not 
exist in 1935, the NLRA could not have protected an action that did 
not exist when it was passed.108 However, an unpersuaded Judge 
Wood noted, Rule 23 was not divined from tabula rasa. Indeed, West 
v. Randall and its progeny proved that collective actions had existed 
                                                          
99 Id. at 1154–55. 




104 Id. at 1151. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 1152. 
107 Id. at 1153. 
108 Id. at 1154. 
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
108 
well before Judicial Conference of the United States first drafted the 
FRCP. Thus, the NLRA protected the class action purported by 
Lewis.109 
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court on the case’s next 
issue: whether Epic’s arbitration clause violated the NLRA.110 
Answering in the affirmative, the unanimous panel held that the 
individual arbitration provision ran afoul of the NLRA; the clause 
prevented employees from suing through a “concerted activity”, and 
thus qualified as an “unfair labor practice.”111 The court distinguished 
itself from the Ninth Circuit—which concluded that, where an 
employer allowed an employee to “opt-out” of an individual 
arbitration without penalty, that employer’s arbitral policy did not 
violate the NLRA.112 While its sister court permitted such arbitration 
clauses to stand, the Seventh Circuit found that an individually 
bargained-for arbitration agreement limiting concerted actions in such 
a way is per se invalid.113 
Finally, on the issue of whether the FAA conflicts with and 
supersedes the NLRA in its mandate to enforce Epic’s arbitration 
clause, Judge Wood interpreted that the former did not bind the court 
to enforce the provision.114 The FAA’s savings clause—which 
requires courts to enforce ADR agreements “save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for [their] revocation”—permitted the 
NLRA class action to continue because the NLRA itself made the 
arbitration clause illegal.115 
                                                          
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1156.  
111 Id. at 1155. 
112 Id. 
113 In her opinion, Judge Wood points out that the NLRB has followed such a 
per se mantra in its hearings as well, and that the Ninth Circuit failed to cite why it 
did not engage practice Chevron deference to the Board’s decisions. I suspect that 
the Ninth Circuit might have been trying to be Solomonic in its decision, given that 
most Supreme Court jurisprudence does not favor employees in such situation. The 
Seventh Circuit’s decision, then, tilts more toward the idealistic. Id. 
114 Id. at 1160. 
115 Id. 
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Wood excoriated the D.R. Horton majority for parroting Scalia’s 
“class arbitration is inefficient” rationale.116 To her, the Fifth Circuit 
had not even attempted to reconcile the two statutes, and instead 
“pick[ed] . . . among congressional enactments.”117 She also took 
Italian Color’s reasoning and spun it on its head. Whereas the 
Supreme Court reasoned that antitrust laws cannot pursue their general 
purpose at all costs (such as in vindicating the rights of negative value 
claimants through class arbitration), Judge Wood posited that the FAA 
cannot usurp all class-action-permitting statutes to protect ADR from 
the judiciary’s scrutiny.118 For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit 
found Epic’s arbitration agreement unenforceable, and affirmed the 
Wisconsin district court.119 
 
II.  FAMILIAR BACKINGS: ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING 
INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION PROVISIONS AND CLASS ARBITRATION 
 
The positions taken by D.R. Horton and Lewis clearly 
disharmonize the circuit courts. The Seventh Circuit went out on a 
limb with Epic Systems, swimming against the jurisprudential current 
followed by other courts of appeal.120 What used to be an uneven split 
disfavoring the Seventh Circuit, though, has recently become more 
even-keeled. On the one hand, the Eighth and Second Circuits agree 
with the Fifth.121 Through August, the Seventh Circuit stood alone 
against its three appellate brethren. However, toward the end of that 
month, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge Wood, and created a more 
even, three-to-two fissure.122 
The policy points that each side argues attract certain special 
interests as well. On the one hand, academics and regulatory agencies 
champion the cause of the lowly plaintiffs’ classes; this pair aims to 
                                                          
116 Id. at 1158. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1161. 
120 See Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 2013); 
Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 744 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013). 
121 See supra note 120. 
122 Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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level the current legal landscape surrounding class arbitration so that 
individuals have a fighting chance.123 On the other side, large law 
firms and special interest groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
advocate for individual arbitration provisions, claiming they reduce 
wasteful litigation and promote the freedom to contract with fewer 
regulatory encumbrances.124 This Note will next shift to assess some 
of these positions; it first summarizes arguments against individual 
arbitration mainly levied by academics and media sources, and then 
dives into the private sector’s ripostes. Finally, it argues why Lewis 
properly sided with academia and regulatory agencies. 
 
A.  Opinions Disfavoring Individual Arbitration 
 
Legal academia coalesces its scholasticism on arbitration 
provisions and class waivers around two similar but distinct cores. 
Some argue for the idealistic, calling for a ban on individual 
arbitration provisions between commercial entities and employees, 
shareholders, and consumers.125 Others fight for a more pragmatic 
(albeit flawed, in my opinion) position that allows for class 
arbitrations.126 Many scholars overarchingly view the commercial 
                                                          
123 See Fitzgerald, supra note 10 at 199; Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration 
Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 266 (2015). 
124 Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Epic Systems v. Lewis, (Nos. 16-285 & 16-
300), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/16-285-16-300-cert-
amicus-chamber.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016); Letter from David Hirschmann, 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, 
and Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, to Ms. 
Monica Jackson, Executive Secretary, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Dec. 
11, 2013) [hereinafter Chamber Letter], 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2013_12.11_CFPB_-
_arbitration_cover_letter.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
125 Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the 
Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 652 (2012), 
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/79_2/03
%20Gilles%20Friedman%20ART.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
126 See Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 
60 Kansas L. Rev. 101, 128 (2012). 
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sector as weaponizing arbitration provisions against individuals in a 
way that exceeds their intended purpose under the FAA.127 Some 
authors analyze the problems they cause in certain sectors like 
employment or business law, while another group spells a far greater 
threat to the general sphere of litigation; one author has gone so far to 
say that arbitration provisions have the propensity to “eliminate 
virtually all class actions.”128 
Perhaps the strongest points scholastics make is the 
inapplicability of arbitration clauses in parties with disparate 
bargaining power.129 The FAA’s legislative history strongly indicates 
that Congress enacted the statute to foster arbitration between 
businesses, not between a business and individuals.130 Why would 
Congress want to limit the FAA only between such parties? After all, 
ADR provides feuding parties an efficient forum for resolving their 
qualms, as the streamlined process avoids the public court system’s 
sluggishness. Rather than a judge deciding an issue through a 
generalist application of the law, ADR supplies an adjudicator with 
specific acuity in a legal niche to precisely apply (at times) arcane 
legal doctrines, and to resolve a conflict between parties.131 If the 
parties would like to circumscribe certain rules of evidence or 
procedure to quicken the arbitration’s pace, then they could 
contractually agree to forego such formalities.132 Parties can still reap 
benefits from such proceedings when they are between an individual 
and a commercial entity. 
                                                          
127 Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 164 n. 9. 
128 Id. at 161. 
129 Id. at 164 n.9. 
130 Id. 
131 Łukasz Gembiś, Are We Dealing with the Trend of Specialised Arbitration?, 
KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (May 9, 2016), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/05/09/are-we-dealing-with-the-trend-of-
specialised-arbitration/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
132 Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff, In Arbitration, a 
‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-
privatization-of-the-justice-system.html?_r=0 (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
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Yet, arbitrations that feature an individual going against a 
business usually do not involve careful negotiation over an arbitration 
clause’s terms.133 Rather, scholastics argue, the commercial actor 
presents a person with a standard-form contract at some “trigger deal” 
such as purchasing a product or share of stock, or obtaining 
employment.134 The individual cannot tailor her contract with the 
commercial actor both because she does not possess sufficient 
bargaining power to convince the business to make contractual 
concessions, and because the business could not feasibly keep track of 
the various bargains it strikes with each individual employee or 
shareholder. Thus, the individual has two options: walk away from the 
“deal” and find another (presumably one that does not feature an 
arbitration provision), or take the “deal” despite its unfavorable terms. 
Many opt for the latter either because they do not care that the “deal” 
cedes their (and the business’s) access to a court, they feel that they 
will not get into a conflict with the business that would result in 
litigation, or they are unwittingly unaware that the contract even has 
an arbitration clause.135 
Narrowing to a labor context, even if a potential employee walks 
away from a contract that limits the parties to individual arbitration 
and seeks a contract without such constrictions, that employee might 
not find an employer that offers such terms. In this example, I assume 
that the employee is searching for jobs in a particularized sector, such 
as a computer manufacturer or cell phone service provider. If that 
sector’s participating companies each possess employment contracts 
with individual arbitration provisions, then that employee would either 
be forced to work in a different market, or—if the employee cannot 
                                                          
133 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 176. 
134 Id. Courts have upheld the validity of such “package” contractual 
provisions, despite the fact that the consumer might not have had the opportunity to 
read the language on the packaging until after she bought it. 
135 Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 132 (“Prevented from joining 
together as a group in arbitration, most plaintiffs gave up entirely, records show. . . . 
Many companies give people a window—typically between 30 and 45 days—to opt 
out of arbitration. Few people actually do, either because they do not realize they 
have signed a clause, or do not understand its consequences, according to plaintiffs 
and lawyers.”). 
21
Hamielec: <i>Lewis</i>'s Shifting <i>Concepcion</i>s: The Seventh Circuit's
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
113 
readily transfer from one industry to another because his work 
experience or education is particularized to one industry—acquiesce to 
a contract requiring arbitration. In this way, certain sectors can 
implicitly act as cartels in their standard-form contracts. 
The choice between an individual accepting such a contract and 
seeking access to a court with a less restrictive contract raises an 
inherent question: how are individuals disadvantaged in arbitration 
through standard-form contracts? For plaintiffs like those in 
Concepcion, whose arbitration terms were rather generous, the 
problem of chronically imbalanced dispute resolution does not seem as 
apparent.136 Under AT&T’s arbitration clause, plaintiffs enjoy a 
convenient location to arbitrate (the plaintiff’s county), AT&T pays 
for the costs of arbitration, and the arbitrator is not capped at a 
damages award.137  
Despite the AT&T contract’s facially favorable terms, the 
benefits reaped by the cellular service provider outnumber those 
enjoyed by individual plaintiffs.138 By requiring individual arbitration, 
AT&T can minimize its exposure to large litigation expenses and 
contain a dispute’s costs to small, individualized arbitral awards as 
                                                          
136 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336–7 (2011). 
137 Id. at 336–37. (“In the event the parties proceed to arbitration, the agreement 
specifies that AT & T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; that arbitration 
must take place in the county in which the customer is billed; that, for claims of 
$10,000 or less, the customer may choose whether the arbitration proceeds in person, 
by telephone, or based only on submissions; that either party may bring a claim in 
small claims court in lieu of arbitration; and that the arbitrator may award any form 
of individual relief, including injunctions and presumably punitive damages. The 
agreement, moreover, denies AT & T any ability to seek reimbursement of its 
attorney's fees, and, in the event that a customer receives an arbitration award greater 
than AT & T's last written settlement offer, requires AT & T to pay a $7,500 
minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant's attorney's fees.”) 
138 Id. at 365 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“But class proceedings have 
countervailing advantages. In general agreements that forbid the consolidation of 
claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their claims rather than to litigate. 
I suspect that it is true even here, for as the Court of Appeals recognized, AT & T 
can avoid the $7,500 payout . . . simply by paying the claim's face value, such that 
‘the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still 
just $30.22.’”). 
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
114 
opposed to a larger class award. Rather than claimants receiving a 
potential benefit from litigation passively—as they would if they were 
in a class and not acting as a class representative—individual 
arbitration requires active litigation on behalf of all plaintiffs if those 
plaintiffs want to collect any damages. The burden to litigate shifts 
from a select individual or small group to many more (depending on 
the scope of the harmful activity, of course). Given this, individual 
arbitration clauses promote an active, “opt-in” form of dispute 
resolution rather than a passive, “opt-out” model (as Rule 23(b)(3) 
class actions normally are structured).139 Such a model prevents 
plaintiffs from filing an action that asks for a lump-sum damages 
award for all putative class members—including passive plaintiffs, 
which give class action damages their “meat.”  
Ultimately, an “opt-in” action dulls class actions’ capabilities of 
fulfilling tort law’s behavior-deterrent purpose.140 One would expect 
that fewer individuals would pursue a claim that requires active 
participation rather than passive participation. Active participation 
requires a claimant to expend time and money, costs that some people 
might not find worthwhile paying relative to the expected damages 
they might receive (or, if they lose, the possibility of facing no reward 
and a hefty bill for attorneys’ fees). With less participation, a 
corporation could be expected to pay out fewer damages awards to a 
smaller pool of plaintiffs. In this sense, individual arbitration 
provisions not only threaten the existence of the class action 
procedure, but also weaken the bedrock of certain principles of tort 
law.141 
                                                          
139 See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(c)(2)(B). Other class actions brought under 
statutory schemes like the Fair Labor Standards Act provide for such an “opt-in” 
structure. Sam J. Smith & Christine M. Jalbert, American Bar Association, 
Certification – 216(b)Collective Actions v. Rule 23 Class Actions & Enterprise 
Coverage under the FLSA 2 (Nov. 2, 2011) (unpublished paper, American Bar 
Association). 
140 Brief of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 
(2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3934621 at *9–14. 
141 See id. 
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Implicitly, Lewis preserves the class mechanism as a means of 
dispute resolution.142 Judge Wood frequently mentioned how the 
NLRA protected covered employees’ abilities to engage in “concerted 
activity.”143 The Act’s legislative history reflects that collective 
actions are intended to provide workers with access to proper redress; 
part of this redress involves levying both ordinary and exemplary 
damages on a defendant so as to chill the behavior that harmed 
individuals in the first place.144 Wood noted that other circuit courts 
took issue with arbitration provisions that proscribed damages 
awards.145 Individual actions would not provide as great a deterrent 
effect on corporations; in addition to business’s reduced exposure to 
actual damages, punitive damages stemming from individual suits 
would be limited to smaller amounts (assuming uniform, single-digit 
multiplier caps) than such damages deriving from a class award. 
Aside from chipping away at tort law’s deterrent effect, 
mandatory individual arbitrations’ proscriptive procedures also 
prevent plaintiffs from presenting a case against a defendant. Clauses 
that limit parties in or prohibit them from introducing experts might 
make an employment discrimination suit depend solely on party 
testimony. Plaintiffs facing such limitations might fail in providing 
sufficient evidence to make out their cause of action. The same effect 
occurs in procedures that limit the amount of interrogatories parties 
may send to one another, or in procedures that limit the amount of 
evidence parties may present to the arbitrator. 
Scholastics argue that even if an arbitration proceeds under 
traditional rules of evidence and procedure, other pecuniary issues 
malign plaintiffs when they individually arbitrate. For example, class 
actions may serve as the only means by which a plaintiff (or a group) 
could afford experts to prove their claim.146 While Lewis did not 
specifically address this financial quandary, other courts have raised it 
                                                          
142 Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1154 (7th Cir. 2016). 
143 Id. at 1152. 
144 Id. at 1153.  
145 Id. at 1160. 
146 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 172–73. 
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in a context that could readily be ascribed to employment actions.147 
To illustrate, if an arbitration provision does not detail whether 
attorneys’ or experts’ fees shift to a party, then the plaintiff will have 
to dole out the costs of those people, all in the hopes that she can 
recover an award that covers the fees she accrued during arbitration. In 
alleged “negative value” suits—claims whose individual cost to 
litigate exceed the expected damages award—plaintiffs cannot 
feasibly litigate without harming themselves financially. On the other 
hand, the commercial defendant, by virtue of being a business entity, 
usually has an ample fisc to cover litigation expenses, and thus can 
afford expert testimony and hefty attorneys’ fees more readily. 
The class action levels the playing field from a dollars 
perspective, as it provides plaintiffs the benefit of cost-sharing 
amongst themselves. While cost-sharing’s virtues are apparent in 
“positive value” claims, its utility is felt most when used in the 
“negative value” suits. Expert witness fees are simply subtracted from 
an aggregate damages award, and then the parties split that cost up 
amongst themselves. In turn, one plaintiff will not be saddled with the 
cost of the expert, and a class’s negative value claims become feasible 
to pursue. 
Additionally, both academics and the Lewis majority scoff at the 
idea that class arbitration—one of individual arbitration’s 
alternatives—is irreconcilable with arbitration’s intended informality. 
One academic paper challenged this claim after Justice Scalia raised it 
in Concepcion’s majority.148 Scalia argued that class arbitration 
threatened ADR’s informality and economy by bogging down a 
speedier alternative to litigation with cumbersome Rule 23 procedures 
                                                          
147 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“Italian Colors cannot prevail in arbitration without an economic 
analysis defining the relevant markets, establishing Amex’s monopoly power, 
showing anticompetitive effects, and measuring damages.”). Employment 
discrimination experts, while presumably not as expensive as experts in economics 
or medicine, still could charge a hefty hourly rate. See Expert Witness Fee Study, 
SEAK, http://www.seak.com/expert-witness-fee-study/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
148 Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y SPECIAL ISSUE 73, 89 (2011). 
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like certification; he felt that until an individual arbitration clause 
affected a parties’ substantive rights, courts would be forced to uphold 
such provisions.149 
In response, Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk noted that 
Scalia’s failure to provide a bright-line rule as to what constituted a 
substantive violation provides the judiciary with capricious latitude in 
enforcing such arbitration provisions.150 While the authors did not 
express a problem with such latitude, they criticized Scalia for 
invalidating California’s attempts at trying to draw a more definitive 
line with its Discover Bank rule.151  
Lewis’s majority took this argument a step further; it criticized 
the Fifth Circuit as mimicking Scalia’s uncompromising protection of 
arbitration’s informality.152 The Seventh Circuit argued D.R. Horton 
was “looking for trouble” when it suggested that “any law that even 
incidentally burdens arbitration . . . necessarily conflicts with the 
FAA.”153 Judge Wood observed that, in its quest to maintain 
arbitration’s relaxed nature, the Fifth Circuit caused the FAA to trump 
a federally granted substantive right—in that case, the right for 
employees to act in concerted activity given to them under the 
NLRA.154 Rather than one statute superseding the other, the two 
statutes should be reconciled.155 In this case, the plaintiffs’ arbitration 
agreement triggered the FAA’s savings clause that enforces arbitration 
agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
. . . .”156 Because the NLRA affirmatively grants the right to concerted 
actions, it would follow that Epic’s individual arbitration provision 
was illegal under the Act, and therefore unenforceable under the 
FAA’s savings clause.157 Judge Wood rebuked Scalia’s standard, 
noting that the FAA “does not ‘pursue its purposes at all costs’”; even 
                                                          
149 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 356 (2011). 
150 Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 148 at 89. 
151 Id. 
152 Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157–58 (7th Cir. 2016). 
153 Id. at 1158. 
154 Id. at 1157–58. 
155 Id. at 1158. 
156 Id. at 1159–60.  
157 Id. at 1160. 
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if Epic’s arbitration clause allowed for class proceedings, such a 
concerted action would be allowed by the NLRA.158 
Several media sources have reported on individual arbitration 
clauses’ effects, and have reached conclusions similar to 
academics’.159 In a lengthy series on arbitration, the New York Times 
determined that not only do few individuals know most standard-form 
contracts contain arbitration provisions, but, once they find out, even 
fewer bother to pursue their claim at all.160 Moreover, the relative lack 
of bargaining power employees and consumers have in negotiating 
their arbitration provisions extends well beyond them; corporations 
wield sufficient leverage to make even their corporate-level executives 
sign arbitration provisions addressing labor disputes.161 
The media also calls arbitrators’ objectivity into question. 
Ostensibly, arbitrators supplied through the two major ADR service 
providers, JAMS and AAA, decide cases in an impartial manner.162 
However, several arbitrators have noted that they felt “beholden to 
                                                          
158 Id. at 1159. While Judge Wood’s point comports with her theory that the 
NLRA requires concerted actions, I question whether a class arbitration would be 
held valid under the NLRA, and then invalidated under the FAA and relegated to 
ordinary class action litigation rather than class arbitration.  
159 Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 37; Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, 
supra note 132; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, In Religious 
Arbitration, Scripture Is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-
scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html; Consumer Reports, Know what you’re giving up 
with arbitration clauses, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 3, 2016), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/01/03/the-consumer-rights-you-giving-
away/1yD9doj2vBZdOKNCkxCmFK/story.html; With Mandatory Arbitration, 




160 Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 135. 
161 Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 37 (“the use of class-action bans is 
spreading far beyond low-wage industries to Silicon Valley and Wall Street, where 
banks like Goldman Sachs require some executives to sign contracts containing the 
clauses.”). 
162 Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 132 (“The American Arbitration 
Association and JAMS [serve as] the country’s two largest arbitration firms . . . .”). 
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companies” because they often paid for the administration of 
arbitration.163 In a common scenario where the individual serves as a 
“one-time player” in the arbitration, and the business acts as a “repeat 
player” that both hires and habitually comes before an arbitrator, that 
arbitrator has a pecuniary interest to arbitrate in favor of the party that 
controls the amount of business provided to her.164 Beyond this 
financial bias, studies have shown that arbitrators form psychological 
biases that favors arbitral “repeat players.”165 
 
B.  Positions Supporting Individual Arbitration 
 
While academics excoriate arbitration provisions’ maladies, 
large law firms and pro-business lobbies advocate for their 
enforcement. Purported “BigLaw” firms’ stance supporting class 
waivers and individual arbitration clauses juxtaposes well with 
professors’.166 That large law firms support individual arbitration 
should not come as a shock; when a plaintiffs’ class sues a 
corporation, the corporation often retains a BigLaw firm to represent 
it, and one should expect the literature these firms distribute to cater to 
clients’ needs. 
                                                          
163 Id. 
164 See id. See also Lisa Bingham, Employment Arbitration: the Repeat Player 
Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 222 (1997). 
165 Bingham, supra note 164 at 223. 
166 Kirkland Alert, Kirkland & Ellis, Supreme Court Upholds Class-Action Ban 
in Arbitration Agreements, 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/Alert_050211.pdf; Memorandum 
from Simpson Thatcher to Clients, May 3, 2011, 
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existing-
content/publications/pub1200.pdf?sfvrsn=2; Consumer Finance Letter – July 2013, 
O’Melveny Myers, Regulators Focus on Attempts to Recover Delinquent Consumer 
Debt, (July 26, 2013), https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-
publications/publications/consumer-finance-newsletter-july-2013/?sc_lang=ja-JP; 
Mayer Brown Newsletter, Mayer Brown, US Employment Litigation Round-Up for 
June 2016, 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/detailprint.aspx?publication=12550 (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
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Weil, Gotshal & Manges published an article that extolled the 
holdings in Concepcion, Italian Colors, and their progeny.167 The 
article warned clients not to reserve the question of whether an 
arbitration clause allows for class arbitration to the arbitrator; rather, 
clients should try to have a court decide the issue of whether a clause 
allows for class arbitration.168 These actions would preserve the 
question of arbitrability for robust appellate review under a de novo 
standard. Additionally, businesses that wish to avoid the threat of class 
arbitration must expressly denote its unavailability directly in the 
contractual provision.169  
Law firms that represent commercial clients issued memos on 
Concepcion and Italian Colors’ potential impacts, and offered 
suggestions on how to trek the new legal landscape.170 A group of 
lawyers from one firm went on to write an op-ed excoriating scholars 
for lamenting class arbitration’s death without any supportive 
empirics.171 They noted that arbitrators continue to allow class 
arbitrations, and did not skirt the point that “negative valueclass 
arbitrations often resulted in negligible or no damage awards for 
plaintiffs, but did yield high plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.172  
                                                          
167 P. Christine Deuelle & Corey Berman, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, The Future 
of Class Arbitration: Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Arbitration Clauses 
Interpretation and Enforceability, CLASS ACTION MONITOR, July 23, 2013, at 1, 
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/Weil_Summer_2013_Class_Action_Monito
r.pdf; David Lender et al., Weil, Gotschal & Manges, U.S. Supreme Court Reaffirms 
Enforceability of Class Arbitration Waivers in Consumer Class Actions, CLASS 





170 See Deuelle & Berman, supra note 167. 
171 James H. Carter and John V.H. Pierce, Have Class Arbitrations Found New 
Life?, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 2015, 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=33a34810-c383-4135-a75c-
bc98bc5e8f7b. 
172 Id. The article notes that in one case, for example, a plaintiffs’ class received 
no actual damage awards, and only $2 million dollars in punitive damage awards, 
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Turning to pro-business lobbying organizations, the United 
States Chamber of Commerce (“the Chamber”) lobbies Congress to 
insulate businesses from the threat of frivolous class actions.173 The 
Chamber has also acts as an ardent amicus throughout the Supreme 
Court’s consideration of these arbitration clauses, including cases like 
Concepcion, Italian Colors, and other landmark cases.174 
The Chamber observed that individual arbitration serves as a 
balanced process amongst participants, and that its critics 
mischaracterize its effects on individual claimants.175 “[A]rbitration 
before a fair, neutral decision maker leads to outcomes for consumers 
and individuals that are comparable or superior to the alternative—
litigation in court—and that are achieved faster and at lower 
expense.”176 The organization keenly mentioned that arbitration, with 
its convenient forum selection and plaintiff-friendly fee-shifting 
clauses, makes arbitration more utilitarian.177 For the Chamber, class 
                                                                                                                                         
which were paid out to two consumer protection organizations. The attorneys, on the 
other hand pocketed $2.6 million in fees. Id. 
173 See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000019798 (last visited Dec. 
2, 2016). 
174 See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 124; Brief of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Business Roundtable, 
American Bankers Association, and National Association of Manufacturers as Amici 
Curiae or Petitioners at 1, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304, 
(No. 12-133) (“[M]any of amici’s members use arbitration agreements in millions of 
their contractual relationships. By eliminating the huge litigation costs associated 
with resolving disputes in court, those agreements create cost savings that result in 
lower prices for consumers, higher wages for employees, and benefits for the entire 
national economy.”). 
175 Letter from David Hirschmann, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, and Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, to Ms. Monica Jackson, Executive Secretary, 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau at 44 (Dec. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Chamber 
Letter], http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2013_12.11_CFPB_-
_arbitration_cover_letter.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016) (“Moreover, claimants can 
effectively vindicate in individual arbitration any claims that might be asserted 
through class actions.”). 
176 Id. at 3. 
177 Id. at 14. 
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actions with small-value claims do not need to be preserved because 
they yield a small benefit to individuals, and merely act as a source of 
enrichment for lawyers with their hefty fee awards.178 
The Chamber highlighted that arbitration acts as a superior 
alternative to the resource-depleted judiciary.179 In a world where 
courts are shuttering their doors and cannot operate under a crushing 
backlog of case dockets, arbitration acts as the only rapid-response 
solution to citizens’ need for redress.180 In a world where class actions 
lead to meager damages awards for plaintiffs, pro-consumer 
arbitration provisions can provide superior recovery amounts per 
plaintiff over litigation.181 In a world where the chance of a plaintiff 
winning in litigation can be reduced to a fifty-fifty coin toss, 
arbitration has not only been disproven as an inferior venue for 
consumers and employees, but has been shown by certain studies to 
serve as an equally effective and occasionally superior venue for the 
same groups.182 
For employment-related arbitrations, the Chamber found that 
ADR served as a blessing rather than a curse. The letter cited to a 2004 
study revealing employees were “almost 20% more likely to win in 
arbitration than in litigated employment cases.”183 Further, the study 
touted, 
 
[L]ow-income employees brought 43.5% of arbitration claims, 
most of which were low-value enough that the employees 
would not have been able to find an attorney willing to bring 
litigation on their behalf. These employees were often able to 
pursue their arbitrations without an attorney, and they won 
                                                          
178 Id. at 47 (“In short, class actions do not provide class members with 
anything close to the benefits claimed by their proponents, although they can . . . 
enrich attorneys—both on the plaintiffs’ and defense side.”). 
179 Id. at 3. 
180 See id. at 4. 
181 See id. at 18. 
182 Id. at 17–22. 
183 Id. at 22. 
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their arbitrations at the same rate as individuals with 
representation.184 
 
Finally, the Chamber deduced that arbitrations between employers and 
high-income employees proved as winnable for the employee as 
litigation.185 
The Chamber opposed federal regulations addressing individual 
arbitration provisions promulgated by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau.186 In eschewing a uniform federal standard that 
rendered such clauses invalid in contracts between individuals and 
financial institutions, the organization argued that states were free to 
declare certain types of arbitration clauses as violating state 
unconscionability standards; indeed, courts have interpreted state 
unconscionability laws as holding such arbitration agreements invalid 
when the plaintiff was capped.187 However, federal schemes regulating 
arbitration agreements overstepped the boundaries of federal authority, 
and created friction between the CFPB’s power and the FAA.188 And 
while the CFPB’s regulation has yet to suffer any litigation 
challenging its validity, it might not live long enough to see that day 
under President Trump. 
I take issue with the Chamber’s assertions; to begin, the notion 
that the commercial sector is resolving disputes in a fashion that 
greatly benefits individuals over traditional litigation is disingenuous. 
While certain plaintiffs may fair better under arbitration than they 
would under a class action, not every plaintiff chooses to pursue 
arbitration in the first place, nor does every plaintiff perform as well as 
the sample of plaintiffs the Chamber chose to measure.189 If each 
                                                          
184 Id. at 21. 
185 Id. 
186 See generally id. 
187 See, e.g., Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 322 Fed. App’x. 489, 492 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2010). 
188 Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32829 (proposed May 3, 2016). 
189 See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 132; AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (““What rational 
lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the 
possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?’”). 
32
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
124 
claimant in a purported class received more in arbitration than they 
would in litigation, and if arbitration is as accessible a procedure as a 
class action, then surely it would be against the business’s best interest 
to facilitate such proceedings, and the business would forego 
arbitration in favor of traditional litigation. For a business to do 
otherwise would be for it to inflict economic harm on itself. 
To provide a more concrete example, assume every person in a 
one-thousand-member putative class proceeded to arbitrate against a 
commercial entity rather than litigate as a class; assume also that each 
person held a valid claim that, when litigated or arbitrated, would 
result in damages for them. If the business was forced to arbitrate, it 
would have to allot a larger allowance for litigation contingencies in 
its retained earnings. First, because each of those claims resulted in an 
award for the plaintiff, the business is paying out the same damages in 
arbitration than it is in litigation. Beyond that, one-thousand 
arbitrations would, from an administrative standpoint, cost more 
money and eat up more time (assuming a favorable clause that shifts 
ADR costs on the business) than a class action, and business would 
suffer more magnified losses than if it had opted for litigation. 
Realistically, arbitration benefits the corporation just as much as it 
does plaintiffs who collect more under it. As mentioned above, 
because arbitration requires a plaintiff’s active participation in the 
proceeding, and because class proceedings—which inherently feature 
a large mass of passive plaintiffs—are often prevented in arbitration 
provisions, the business expects fewer plaintiffs to devote their 
resources toward pursuing a claim.190 The passive class member does 
not exist in arbitration, which allows business to enjoy reduced total 
costs of dispute resolution because fewer people pursue their claim.191 
Further, as I briefly noted previously, arbitration also reduces the 
threat of another liability for businesses: large punitive damages 
awards. Historically, class awards that culminate in significant sums of 
ordinary damages also featured large punitive damages. Courts award 
these exemplary damages as a means of deterring an actor’s unwanted 
behavior from habitual repetition. Because the Supreme Court has 
                                                          
190 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
191 See id. 
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jurisprudentially limited their magnitude to single digit multipliers of 
ordinary damages, they achieve their deterrent purposes optimally 
when attached to large ordinary damages awards.192 But because many 
commercial entities have foreclosed the class proceeding as a viable 
means, punitive damages will have to be levied in individual 
arbitrations.193 In advancing the arbitral regime of dispute resolution, 
commercial entities have almost completely shielded themselves from 
any significant financial exposure to exemplary damages.194 
Why is this bad? For one, it allows a business to supply products, 
services, and employment with certain societal deficiencies. An 
example might help illustrate this point. Let us consider a shareholder 
who decides to invest in a company that just became listed on a public 
exchange. The Securities Act of 1933 mandates that before a 
corporation goes public—absent any exemption—it must file a 
registration statement that includes a prospectus warning investors of 
risks associated with an investment in that company.195 If a 
shareholder acquires stock that requires individual arbitration under its 
stock legend, and somebody later discovers the representations made 
in the prospectus were deficient, that shareholder and all other 
shareholders purchasing that stock in an the company’s initial public 
offering would have a cause of action against the corporation.196 But 
because the stock legend expressly called for individual arbitration of 
claims, the shareholders would have to proceed alone in their dispute 
with the company. 
                                                          
192 Brief of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, supra note 140. 
193 The Chamber does acknowledge that this occurs. See Chamber Letter, supra 
note 175 at 18. (“Claimants are able to win not only compensatory damages but also 
‘other types of damages, including attorneys’ fees, punitive damages, and interest.’ 
In particular, 63.1% of prevailing claimants who sought attorneys’ fees were 
awarded them.”). 
194 Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 190 (“As I noted at the outset, in many cases, 
these waivers are tantamount to insulating businesses altogether from liability for the 
small-stakes injuries they cause. Why wouldn’t every business want such 
insulation?”). 
195 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(g) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 114-244). 
196 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(k) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 114-244). 
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Let us further assume the shareholder wins his suit, or settles with 
the corporation. Not only do many arbitration provisions mandate, pre-
dispute, that shareholder to sign a confidentiality agreement with any 
potential outcome, but the doctrine of collateral estoppel may not 
apply to the commercial entity in arbitration.197 This could paralyze 
potential claimants from discussing the results of the arbitration with 
one another or the public, which can harm current investors in the 
company who unwittingly remain invested despite undisclosed risks, 
and which makes markets less efficient. The absence of preclusion 
also would allow the corporation to avoid pre-established liability 
from any previous arbitration, which gives the opportunity for the 
corporation to both win and lose claims stemming from similar or 
identical fact patterns. This hypothesis strengthens when considering 
the Note’s previous discussions about arbitrator’s biases that favor 
“repeat players.” That is to say, if an arbitrator rules against the 
corporation, nothing prevents the business from simply using another 
arbitrator—perhaps a more favorably-ruling one—in the future.198 
I do not mean to completely discredit the arguments advanced by 
proponents of individual arbitrations. Some of them are compelling, so 
much so that the Supreme Court has agreed with their propositions. 
The decision between affirming individual arbitration clauses and 
striking them is difficult, and it seems that the considerations, while 
veiled in policy, tend to boil down into normative results. With a class 
action, putative claimants who survive class certification will likely 
recover something, though that amount could be paltry in comparison 
                                                          
197 Ann Conley, Promoting Finality: Using Offensive, Nonmutual Collateral 
Estoppel in Employment Arbitration, 5 UC Irvine L. Rev. 651, 652 (2015), 
http://www.law.uci.edu/lawreview/vol5/no3/Conley.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016) 
(“There is no settled law in this area to answer these questions for employers, 
employees, or arbitrators. The central question of this Note is whether employees 
can use offensive, nonmutual collateral estoppel in employment arbitration.”). 
198 See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 132 (“But in interviews with 
The Times, more than three dozen arbitrators described how they felt beholden to 
companies. Beneath every decision, the arbitrators said, was the threat of losing 
business.”). This implies that arbitrator would be more inclined to decide a case in 
favor of a “repeat player” that could provide consistent business. See Bingham, 
supra note 164 at 223 
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to the harm done by the actor199; with individual arbitration, many 
claimants will either not pursue the claim, or, when faced with an 
onerous arbitration provision, not recover at all.200 The decision likens 
to a “pick your poison” scenario. For these reasons, courts have spilt a 
great deal of ink and have split on whether individual arbitration 
provisions should be upheld or stricken.201 The decision confounds 
judges both state and federal, from the trial-level and appellate rungs 
to our nation’s highest court. It is not easy. 
And as things stand now, supporters of arbitration provisions have 
proven highly competent in advancing their arguments in cases 
involving contractual arbitration provisions and class waivers.202 The 
Chamber, for example, has already filed a brief with the Supreme 
Court that supports Epic’s petition.203 Given Epic’s appeal and prayer 
for reversal, and for the reasons noted in Part III, infra, I join the 
Chamber’s zealousness in having this nation’s highest court review 
Lewis. However, where the Chamber seeks reversal, I seek 
affirmation. 
 
III.  JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY SOLUTIONS: THE SUPREME COURT 
SHOULD UPHOLD THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S EPIC DECISION 
 
Predictably, when the Seventh Circuit handed down Lewis—and 
especially after the Ninth Circuit joined its position by invalidating 
employment contracts’ arbitration clauses in Morris v. Ernst & Young, 
                                                          
199 Chamber Letter, supra note 124 at 21. See also AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
200 Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 37 (“Corporations said that class 
actions were not needed because arbitration enabled individuals to resolve their 
grievances easily. But court and arbitration records show the opposite has happened: 
once blocked from going to court as a group, most people dropped their claims 
entirely.”). 
201 See supra Parts II.B–II.F. 
202 The success these lobbying groups have had in the Supreme Court 
demonstrates this the best. See supra Parts II.B–II.F 
203 Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Epic Systems v. Lewis, (Nos. 16-285 & 16-
300), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/16-285-16-300-cert-
amicus-chamber.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
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LLP—the Supreme Court swiveled its attention back to class actions 
and arbitration provisions after leaving the topic dormant for more 
than three years, and granted certiorari in mid-January. For them, 
Lewis checks all the boxes that makes a case ripe for the Court’s 
consideration: it features a disagreement between federal appellate 
courts on how the law should be settled when individual arbitration 
clauses fly in the face of the NLRA. Additionally, the case concerns a 
legal topic whose subject matter causes the Court itself to split five-to-
four. Finally, the Lewis holding would impact wide swaths of the 
populace in an important and intimate part of their lives: employment. 
The case for granting certiorari was strong. And while the Court has 
yet to hear Lewis’s oral arguments, it has strong motivations to hold 
off on this task until the Senate confirms Judge Gorsuch and he warms 
a freshly hewn Court seat.  
The current justices recognize their previous cases have put them 
at loggerheads with one another, and an evenly-split, eight-justice 
Court would simply affirm the Seventh Circuit’s holding with non-
binding effect on the other federal circuits.204 Thus, their current 
abstention from hearing oral arguments until the October 2017 term is 
unsurprising. Nevertheless, once the Court returns to its nine-justice 
normality, it should affirm the Seventh Circuit’s holding that 
invalidates Epic’s arbitration clause. 
Why affirm Lewis? First, the Supreme Court’s decision in such a 
case—irrespective of whether the Court affirms or reverses the 
Seventh Circuit—would answer an otherwise ignored question: does 
the FAA supersede statutes that permit collective actions, do such 
statutes trump the FAA, or must courts reconcile the two statutory 
schemes? The Court’s definitive holding (unless it only garners a 
plurality opinion) would provide lower federal courts a means of 
analogizing to Lewis when assessing other statutes similar to the 
NLRA. Thus, if a securities statute permits collective action against a 
corporation, lower federal courts would be able to graft the Court’s 
interpretation in Lewis to such a statute and conclude whether a case’s 
plaintiffs are entitled to a class action, or whether each claimant must 
                                                          
204 See United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. ___ (2016); Friedrichs v. California 
Teachers Association, 135 S.Ct. 1083 (Mem) (2016). 
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proceed on an individual basis. Presumably, the same would occur in 
statutes addressing consumers’ rights. In taking up Lewis for 
argument, the Supreme Court would color in another section of the 
fragmented jurisprudence surrounding class actions and the FAA. 
More importantly, the Court should uphold the Seventh Circuit 
because to not do so would result in seismic shifts in the legal 
landscape of employment law. A reversal of Lewis’s holding would 
effectively relegate any employment dispute—whether for something 
as purely financial as unpaid wages to something as personal as race 
and gender discrimination suits—to individual arbitration. Nothing 
would stop employers from enforcing individual arbitration clauses 
into all its employees’ contracts.  
Ostensibly, one could argue that not all businesses would 
necessarily blunt their employees’ rights to collective action through 
such contractual provisions. Yet, assuming the Court does reverse 
Judge Wood’s opinion, what would cause businesses to not 
incorporate individual arbitration clauses in all their employment 
contracts?205 The agreements curb damages awards (both 
compensatory and punitive) businesses pay out to claimants through 
individual arbitration, and reduce potential allowance accounts in a 
company’s retained earnings statement (or balance sheet). They save 
the corporation money relative to traditional court filings. They 
prevent communication amongst claimants in arbitration through non-
disclosure provisions. What does a business have to lose?  
Even if one takes the Chamber of Commerce’s point in Part II, 
infra, at face value—that is, that individuals recover more from an 
employer in individual arbitration than in class litigation—virtually 
nothing deters a commercial entity from engaging in the unwanted 
behavior for which it was sued in the first place. As noted above, 
while a business’s employees may have their individual harms 
redressed, the workforce as a whole might not, and the business is free 
to continue its socially harmful behavior without any retributive threat 
                                                          
205 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 190 (“In my view, this question—whether 
businesses will take advantage of the opportunity to slip arbitration clauses with 
class action waivers into all their contracts—is largely a rhetorical one. Why 
wouldn’t businesses take advantage of this opportunity?”). 
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from its workforce. That means that unpaid wages could continue to 
go unpaid for those unaware that they were deprived of their earnings, 
and women and minority workers would experience no improvement 
in promotional opportunities. At its worst, arbitration clauses could 
allow businesses to operate with a non-diverse workforce without any 
internal pressures to change.206 
In the end, the issue remains whether Judge Gorsuch would vote 
alongside Judge Wood and reconcile the FAA with the NLRA, or 
whether this justice would determine that the former supersedes the 
latter and preserves individual arbitrations.207 While the choice for a 
conservative justice seems clear-cut from a political ideology, the 
issue blurs when one assesses the issue from a statutorily interpretive 
lexicon. Few would argue that the Seventh Circuit’s decision to 
invalidate Epic’s arbitration provision in its contracts qualifies as a 
politically liberal decision; the result strips away a pro-business 
safeguard and exposes Epic to increased risk. 
However, Judge Wood had to assess Lewis within the Supreme 
Court’s established analyses in Concepcion and Italian Colors.208 In 
doing so, she argued that conservative doctrines of statutory 
interpretation require that “when two statutes are capable of co-
existence . . . it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed 
congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective” 
and that “‘[w]hen two statutes complement each other’—that is, ‘each 
has its own scope and purpose’ and imposes ‘different requirements 
and protections’—finding that one precludes the other would flout the 
congressional design.”209 Wood posited that because the NLRA 
invalidates Epic’s contractual provision (by preventing enforcement of 
contract provisions that abrogate collective actions), such an 
invalidation qualifies as the clause being illegal “upon grounds in law 
                                                          
206 This is true unless the employees resort to a walk-out or the market reacts 
negatively to such provisions, an unlikely event because many people don’t know 
the contracts they sign contain arbitration provisions. 
207 See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1158–59 (7th Cir. 2016); 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011); Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013). 
208 Lewis, 812 F.3d at 1158–59. 
209 Id. at 1157, 1159. 
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or in equity” under the FAA.210 Concluding, Wood observed that the 
two statutes can symbiotically work with one another, and one did not 
oust the other.211  
 Judge Gorsuch will face an interpretive fork: he could either 
assume the Seventh Circuit’s reconciliation of the FAA and the 
NLRA—which, assuming the nominee carries a textualist pedigree, 
would likely comport with her jurisprudential philosophy on 
constitutional and statutory interpretation—or he could perpetuate 
Justice Scalia’s trailblazing interpretation of the FAA that preserves 
arbitration in the vast majority of contexts. A fiscally neoliberalist 
platform adopted by many Republicans in Congress would call for a 
nominee who would carry Italian Colors’ holding into the 
employment setting.212 But that policy point seems to go against 
conservative forms of statutory interpretation.213 Thus, the Court’s 
ruling on Lewis remains enshrouded in uncertainty. The Court would 
splinter, likely five-to-four or six-to-three, but which way the majority 
falls can only be answered with time. 
If the Court reverses Lewis, such a sudden upheaval in the way 
employment actions are brought could trigger remedial legislation 
from Congress that would undo the Court’s holding. Despite 
Republicans’ traditional, pro-business platform, the 2016 election 
                                                          
210 Id. 
211 See id. at 1159–60. 
212 Neoliberalism, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/neoliberalism.asp?lgl=no-infinite (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2016). See George Monbiot, Neoliberalism – the Ideology at the Root of All 
Our Problems, GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-
george-monbiot (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). As suggested by The Guardian’s article, 
in this case, the United States has a legislative scheme in place that transfers some of 
peoples’ access to courts through a mutually-agreed-to contract. If efficiency can be 
achieved in arbitration over litigation, then a neoliberal economist would argue for a 
political and judicial climate that favors arbitration.  
213 See William Eskirdge et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation and 
Regulation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 639 (5th ed. 2014); Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of 
Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment within 
Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 702, 704–714 (2014). 
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injected the GOP with a strong populist ire that allowed Donald 
Trump to . . . well . . . trump his Republican colleagues in the 
primaries and Hilary Clinton in the general election.214 Republican 
lawmakers, along with blue-collar Democrat legislators, might 
propose legislation that preserves the class action explicitly under the 
NLRA and statutes like it in the securities and consumer settings. 
Though, admittedly, similar legislation has been previously proposed 
under Republican-controlled Congresses, and has not received so 
much as a discussion in committee.215 Yet, one other avenue exists for 
remedial reform: administrative regulation. 
Alluded to previously, the CFPB has drafted a regulation that 
proscribes financial institutions from including arbitration provisions 
in their consumer contracts that foreclose parties from filing a class 
action against the financial institution.216 While such a regulation is on 
President Trump’s chopping block along with the rest of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, its regulation 
of consumers’ financial contracts demonstrates a structure that other 
agencies can use to regulate arbitration provisions in their own 
spheres. Thus, the NLRB, for example, could draw up a regulation to 
the tune of the CFPB’s, one which prevents employers from drafting 
arbitration agreements that preclude any class action filings for 
employment discrimination cases. The same can be said of the 
                                                          
214 See generally Michael Kazin, Trump and American Populism: Old Whine, 
New Bottles, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-10-06/trump-and-
american-populism (last visited Dec. 2, 2016); Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Trump’s 
Populism is Not Just a Western Phenomenon, NEW YORKER (Nov. 16, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/benjamin-wallace-wells/trumps-populism-is-not-
just-a-western-phenomenon (last visited Dec. 2, 2016); Michael Lind, Donald 
Trump, the Perfect Populist, POLITICO (Mar. 9, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-the-perfect-populist-
213697 (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
215 H.R. 2087: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, GovTrack, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2087 (last visited Dec. 2, 2016); S. 
2506: Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2016, GovTrack, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s2506 (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). As the 
website notes, both bills have a one percent chance of being enacted. 
216 Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32829 (proposed May 3, 2016). 
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Securities and Exchange Commission, which could enact a similar 
regulatory regime in the context of stock certificates or other security-
related contracts. 
Just as with the CFPB’s proposed rule, one must question the 
likelihood of such regulations taking place over the next four years.217 
And just like other regulations, those that abrogate arbitration 
provisions would likely be the subject of litigation, and judges would 
be reluctant to stray away from deferring to agencies’ expertise in 
accordance with the Chevron doctrine218 (even with Judge Gorsuch’s 
questionable jurisprudence on this deference).219 Challenges aside, the 
administrative arm of the federal government remains an open avenue 




 Few recognize how much the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Federal Arbitration Act affects the populace’s access to 
courts.220 As contractual provisions erode the class action 
mechanism’s prevalence, there arises a need for judges, legislators, 
and regulators to step in and support individuals’ abilities to 
collectively litigate. Just as it has in other hot-button issues, Justice 
Scalia’s death—alongside the Senate’s effective obstruction of Judge 
                                                          
217 Reuters, Donald Trump Says He Would Dismantle Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform Act, FORTUNE (May 18, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/18/trump-dodd-
frank-wall-street/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). See also Liz Weston, Commentary: 
Save the CFPB, Mr. President-elect, CBS NEWS (Nov. 21, 2016), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/commentary-save-the-cfpb-consumer-financial-
protection-bureau-mr-president-elect-donald-trump/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
218 Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, Lecture delivered at Duke University School of Law 
(January 24, 1989), in 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 511 (1989).  
219 Jonathan A. Adler, Should Chevron be Reconsidered? A Federal Judge 
Thinks So, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/24/should-
chevron-be-reconsidered-a-federal-judge-thinks-so/?utm_term=.94a025054e87. 
220 Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 132. 
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Garland and President Trump’s nomination of Neil Gorsuch221—has 
caused scholars to question whether the Court’s newest member will 
take up the conservative mantle of his predecessor, or instead 
adjudicate with a more moderate jurisprudence. To that end, Lewis 
offers the Court an opportunity to either shift its scorched-earth stance 
on arbitration toward a balanced relationship between private dispute 
resolution and class litigation, or maintain the status quo and let class 
actions slip off into procedural extinction. Ultimately, the judiciary, 
and indeed the public must ask itself: do we ever want to see a case 
like Ms. Rajender’s again? As is frequently the answer to such a 
question, only time will tell. Nevertheless, while the Court may 
struggle with this case, this student has made up his mind: Lewis 
merits affirmation, if not for the mere fact that a reversal would bring 
the country one step closer to the death knell of the class action. 
                                                          
221 The Times Editorial Board, End the Outrageous Delay on Garland’s 
Nomination, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-garland-gop-20160809-snap-
story.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
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